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STUDENT NOTES
THE DOCTRINE.OF ,BLUE VALLEY CREAMERY CO. v. CRONIMUS
"Before entering into a discussion of the questions involved, we
must say that the proceeding here is not only novel, but unprece-
dented." Thus wrote Judge Baird in his opinion in the recent Ken-
tucky case of Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Cronimus,- which laid down
a new doctrine of res fudicata for Kentucky.
The case involved the effect of a judgment in favor of an agent
upon a subsequent action against his principal, the latter action arising
out of the same accident and the principal's liability being entirely
dependent upon the principle of respondeat superior.
The facts of the case were as follows: In March, 1935, trucks of
the Blue Valley Creamery Co. and Cronimus collided at an intersec-
tion in Louisville, Kentucky. Both trucks were being operated by
agents at the time. As a result of the collision both trucks were dam-
aged, and Bohn, the driver of Cronimus' truck, and one Eastin, who
was with him at the time, were injured.
Bohn and Eastin then filed separate suits against the Creamery
Company for personal injuries, their actions being based upon the
alleged negligence of the Creamery Company's driver, Jenkins, In
operating its truck. The suits were tried together and judgments were
rendered against the Creamery Company upon the ground that the
negligence of its agent was the sole and proximate cause of the
collision.
The Creamery Company then sued Cronimus, praying judgment
for damages to its truck. This claim was founded upon alleged negli-
gence of Bohn in operating Cronimus' truck. After the jury had been
empaneled and sworn, the judge retired with counsel to his chambers
and announced that in his opinion the question of responsibility for
the accident had been adjudicated in the prior Bohn-Eastin actions,
and that he had, on his own motion, made the record of those cases
a part of the record in the present case. He further announced that
he was dimissing the petition of the Creamery Company, and would
allow evidence to be presented only as to the damage to Cronimus'
truck, asserted by him in a counterclaim. The trial, completed under
this ruling, resulted in a judgment for Cronimus for the damages to
his truck. It was this proceeding to which Mr. Justice Baird referred
as "not only novel, but unprecedented."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial
court, and laid down the following rule for Kentucky:
"Where liability, if any, of a principal or master to a third
person is purely derivative and dependent entirely on the prin-
1270 Ky. 496, 110 S. W. (2d) 286 (1937).
SIbid.
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gence on the part of the servant or agent must necessarily relieve the
master or principal, as there was then no medium through which negli-
•gence could be attributed to the master or principal. But it was not
until the case of Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Applegate's Almx., et al.,1
that the court hesitated in applying this rule, although it did state in
several previous opinions that there was much to be said for the argu-
ment advanced against it.
In the Applegate case the court said: "This rule was based on the
theory that master and servant were joint tort-feasors. The theory, of
course, was erroneous." It further critized the rule, but applied it in
that case to prevent an injustice to the appellee who had practiced his
case In conformity with the rule announced in the Murphy and subse.
quent cases.
It is to be noted in all of the cases cited and discussed so far, in
which the rule of the Murphy case has been applied, that master and
servant were sued in the same action.7 In this respect they differ from
the present case, and the exact question raised by it did not, therefore,
arise. But in Myers' Admx. v. Brown,8 a situation very similar to that o
the present case was presented, and the rule of the Murphy case was
applied. Thus, it is by comparison with this case that we find the exacl
differences in theory and application of the two rules.
The facts and holding of the Myers' case are briefly as follows:
Clancy Brown, a minor, while driving his father's automobile, ran intc
and killed Myers. Myers' administratrix brought suit against th
father under the family purpose doctrine-an agency theory. Thif
action was defended by a traverse of the alleged negligence of the sot
and a plea of contributory negligence as to Myers. The jury found v
verdict for the father. Thereafter suit was brought against the sot
to recover for his alleged negligent killing of Myers. The judgment
in favor of the father was pleaded as a bar to any recovery agains
the son, but the court in its decision stated that the rule and theor3
of the Murphy case applied though the master and servant were suec
separately. It thus held that a judgment in favor of a master or prin
cipal was not res judicata in a subsequent suit against the servan
or agent, although the liability of the former was derived solely from
and entirely dependent upon, the principle of respondeat superior.
Before a final consideration of the holdings of the two cases,
short discussion of res judicata as applied in this situation is necessary
Res judicata is in reality a plea in estoppel, and as a general rule, fo:
a judgment to be binding upon third persons, there must be privity
and the estoppel" must be mutual. The case of master and servan
relationship, when the servant is acting within the scope of his author
'268 Ky. 458, 105 S. W. (2d) 153 (1936).
7 See cases cited supra note 4.
' 250 Ky. 64, 61 S. W. (2d) 1052 (1933).
11 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed., 1925), Sec. 407.
"1 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 9, Sec. 428.
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Ity, however, appears to be an exception to these requirements, the
courts either denying or overlooking them in their decisions.
The Kentucky courts have not followed the above mentioned
exceptions in applying either of the two rules under discussion.
In the Myers' case it was held that there was no privity between
the master and servant as they were to be treated as joint
tort-feasors. Some mention of mutuality also was made, the court stat-
ing that the principle of mutuality would be violated should the former
judgment be admitted in bar, since the servant, the son, had no right
of Indemnity as against the master, the father. But the decision is
based primarily upon the erroneous theory laid down in the Murphy
case, that master and servant are joint tort-feasors.
The reasoning of the Myers' case is broken down in its entirety by
the Court of Appeals in the present case. The fundamental step was
taken when the erroneous theory of holding master-nd servant to be
joint tort-feasors was discarded. After that advance, the rule of pro-
cedure as against joint tort-feasors having thus been dispensed with,
It would have been possible for the court to have applied the exceptions
set forth above and have reached their same decision. But it went
further and held (1) the parties to be identical by "agency-privity";
and (2) that the estoppel worked by the prior judgment operated the
same as to both parties, and thus was mutual. Hence, by this decision,
master and servant are said to be in privity where the liability is
predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, and a judgment
for one is res judicata in an action against the other, the estoppel
being mutual.
Whereas, the rule of res judicata is the essence of this decision, it
Is to be noted that it is important in Kentucky not merely upon that
one point, but also because (1) it places the relationship of master
and servant for an act done by the agent within the scope of his
authority upon a new basis, (2) it corrects a long line of erroneous
rulings,2 and (3) it establishes in Kentucky the rule which is followed
generally 3 in the United States.
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nPortland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. 63
(1907); 1 Freeman, op. cit. supra note 9, Secs. 409, 429, 469, 470-79.
U See cases cited supra note 4.
"2Bradley v. Rosenthal, et al., 154 Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875 (1908);
Williams v. Hines, et al., 80 Fla. 690, 86 S. W. 695 (1920); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Harbin, et al., 135 Ga. 122, 68 S. E. 1103 (1910); Hayes v.
Chicago Telephone Co., et al., 218 Ill. 414, 75 N. E. 1003 (1905); Chil-
dress v. Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co., et al., - Ind. App. -, 101 N. E. 332
(1913); Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326, 63 Am. Dec. 627 (1855); McGin-
nis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., et al., 200 Mo. 347, 98 S. W. 590
(1906); Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., et al., 211 N. Y. 228, 105 N. E.
423 (1914); Cressler v. Brown, 79 Okla., 170, 192 Pac. 417 (1920);
D. B. Loveman Co. v. Bayless, 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S. W. 841 (1913);
Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 Pac. 572 (1901).
"Where the right to recover is dependent solely upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior, and there is a finding that the servant, through
K. L. J.-7
